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Abstract  This article describes research in developing a new theory of decision 
support in negotiation in family law mediation.  AssetDivider was based on the 
principles of Family_Winner.  As a Negotiation Decision Support System 
Family_Winner take ratings assigned to items by the parties involved and develops 
a list of allocations to each party; based on trade-offs inherently present in the 
dispute.  Given advice provided from our industry partners Relationships Australia 
(Queensland) - RAQ, AssetDivider uses an ideal “percentage split” to guide the 
development of an allocation list for parties.  The system has been tested 
informally by our contacts at RAQ, and we now look forward to extensive testing 
and evaluation by mediators at RAQ in the near future.  We expect observations 
and comments made by mediators evaluating the system to indicate future 
developments, in particular in developing new research into emotionally intelligent 
NDSS. 
Keywords: Negotiation Support Systems, Mediation, Family Law 
1.  Introduction 
The focus of this research is in extending our work in interest-based negotiation to 
developing research into systems for use in mediations.  We have developed several 
Negotiation Support Systems (NSS) including DEUS, Split_Up and Family_Winner 
[1].  As a direct result of media interest in Family_Winner [Bellucci and Zeleznikow, 
2006], we were contacted and have been in negotiations with Relationships Australia 
Queensland (RAQ) in developing research.  Relationships Australia is a relationship 
support service which conducts support services across numerous areas, including 
family mediation, parenting courses, pre-marriage counselling, and special support 
services such as counselling to families affected by drought and flooding.  Although 
the organisation operates throughout Australia, our contact is with the Queensland 
branch.  We have been in contact with RAQ to develop a new methodology based on 
Family_Winner that will better represent the needs of the mediation sector.   
Victoria University has provided us with funds to support research with our 
industry partners to develop research in negotiation tools used in family law 
negotiation.  In [2] we initially investigated the issue of how to add notions of fairness 
to interests, which we have now developed more fully in AssetDivider. 
Negotiation is a process by which two or more parties conduct communication or 
conferences with the view of resolving differences between them [1].  We believe 
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cooperation between parties as paramount to ensuring both parties are satisfied with the 
outcome of the negotiation.  Their involvement in the decision-making process 
encourages agreement with the settlement.  Mutually satisfying resolutions [3] describe 
settlements arrived at by the interaction and input of disputants.  Mediators agree with 
the need for mutually satisfying agreements and are willing to use a NDSS if it can 
support the realities of the negotiation in the domain.  We know this because RAQ are 
eager to use our software.   
As mentioned above, AssetDivider uses the principles of Family_Winner.  The 
underlying principle of each system is in their use of interests.  The theory that best 
supports our definition of negotiation support is Principled Negotiation [20], developed 
under the Harvard Negotiation Project.  It emphasizes parties’ look for mutual gains 
and focuses on the underlying values (or interests) that justify a disputant’s position, as 
opposed to attempting negotiation solely from their positions.  
Family_Winner takes a common pool of items and distributes them between two 
parties based on the value of associated ratings.  Each item is listed with two ratings (a 
rating is posted by each party), which signify the item’s importance to the party.  A 
rating in Family_Winner is a number in value from 0- 100 (0 being of no importance; 
100 to signify absolute importance).  The algorithm to determine which items are 
allocated to whom works on the premise that each parties’ ratings sum to 100; thereby 
forcing parties to set priorities.  The program always checks this is the case, and if not, 
it realigns ratings to ensure all sum to 100.  The basic premise of the system is that it 
allocates items based on whoever values them more.  Once an item has been allocated 
to a party, the ratings of the remaining items are modified (according to the actions of 
trade-offs) to ensure the items (and their associated ratings) are ready for the next round 
of allocation [1]. 
Family_Winner was evaluated by a number of family solicitors at Victoria Legal 
Aid (VLA).  Whilst the solicitors were very impressed with the way Family_Winner 
suggested trade-offs and compromises, they had one major concern – that in focusing 
upon negotiation, the system had ignored the issues of justice [2].  For example, 
Family_Winner simply allocates property to parties based on their interest in the item.  
It does not allow for monetary values to influence the allocation process.  The dollar 
value of items is important to the dispute because each party wants to be allocated the 
right or ‘just’ amount of money.  This concept contrasts with linking an interest value 
to an item, which is intrinsically different.  An interest is an evaluation based on the 
significance of the item to a person.  For example, party A maybe very fond of a lamp 
that has been passed down throughout the generations, and consequently they give it a 
rating of 50.  The remaining items are not as important to party A, and so are given 
much lower ratings.  Whilst using interests to negotiate is a very interesting exercise, it 
does in no way reflect the dollar value of the item.  This is where Family_Winner fails 
to support the mediation process effectively.  Whilst Mediators from RAQ believe 
Family_Winner’s approach to interest-based negotiation (through the setting of 
priorities) is very useful, they are also concerned with the missing influence of 
monetary values.  Hence, our new theory of negotiation support (implemented in 
AssetDivider) incorporates the basis of Family_Winner’s allocation and trade-off 
strategy utilizing both interests and an item’s monetary value. 
Section 2 will detail this new theory of negotiation support, and will in particularly 
outline differences between Family_Winner and AssetDivider.  Section 3 will outline a 
common case and its process through AssetDivider’s screens and output.  Mediators at 
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RAQ provided this example to us.  In the next couple of months, it is expected 
mediators at RAQ will evaluate AssetDivider formally.  
2. Negotiation Concepts 
Early decision-support negotiation systems primarily used Artificial Intelligence 
techniques to model negotiation.  LDS [4] used rule-based reasoning to assist legal 
experts in settling product liability cases.  SAL [5] also used rule-based reasoning to 
help insurance claim adjusters evaluate claims related to asbestos exposure.  
NEGOPLAN [6] is a rule based system written in PROLOG which advised upon 
industrial disputes in the Canadian paper industry.  Mediator [7] used case retrieval and 
adaptation to propose solutions to international disputes, while PERSUADER [8] 
integrated case based reasoning and decision-theoretic techniques to provide decision 
support to United States' industrial disputes.   
Negotiation Support Systems (NSS) were primarily responsible for tracking past 
preferences and informing disputants about progress being made towards a solution to 
a conflict. We refer to these systems as template systems.  Template systems assume 
disputants take on a passive role after the initial intake of preferences and issues, since 
they fail to implement any strategies that incorporate change.  Modelling the dynamic 
properties of negotiation infers the incorporation of decision support into a traditional 
negotiation support system.  DEUS [9], INTERNEG [10], CBSS [11], Negotiator Pro 
and The Art of Negotiating [12] are all template based systems. 
We are most interested in extending the primary role of a template based NSS to a 
system capable of providing decision support.  We have classified these as Negotiation 
Decision Support Systems (NDSS).  A Negotiation Decision Support System (NDSS) 
supports negotiation by modelling the properties of a template NSS as well as applying 
functions to interpret the goals, wants and needs of the parties to provide advice on 
how disputes can be settled.   
Our earliest NDSS was Family_Negotiator [13].  It utilises a hybrid rule-based and 
case-based system to provides disputants with advice on how to best resolve the issues 
in an Australian Family Law dispute.  Whilst evaluating the Family_Negotiator system, 
we discovered that Family Law negotiation was not an appropriate domain in which to 
apply either Case-based or Rule-based Reasoning, due principally to the open textured 
nature1
AdjustWinner [14] uses a utility function to achieve equal distribution of the 
common pool.  The algorithm used in the system was the Adjusted Winner procedure 
[15].  AdjustWinner resolves a dispute by dividing issues and items among disputants, 
through a mathematical manipulation of numeric preferences.  Although not classed as 
a NSS, AdjustWinner provided the framework for decision-making support that was 
later incorporated into a NSS to form Family_Winner. 
, of the domain.  Nor did the overall framework of Family_Negotiator provide 
in-depth solutions expected from real-life negotiations.  
Family_Winner is a negotiation decision support system that allocates items to one 
of two parties in the dispute.  Family_Winner’s method of decision support involves a 
complex number of techniques, including the incorporation of an Issue Decomposition 
                                                          
1 Open textured legal predicates contain questions that cannot be structured in the form of production rules or 
logical propositions and which require some legal knowledge on the part of the user in order to answer  
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Hierarchy, a Compensation and Trade-off strategy, and an Allocation strategy.  The 
trade-offs pertaining to a disputant are graphically displayed through a series of trade-
off maps, while an Issue Decomposition Hierarchy enables disputants to decompose 
issues to any required level of specification.   
Mediator, Persuader, NEGOPLAN and Family_Negotiator are considered to be 
intelligent systems since they can generate solutions using the system’s internal 
knowledge as well as users input.  All incorporate some level of negotiation support, 
together with the ability to provide users with a resolution to the current problem.   
Artificial Intelligence techniques such as case-based, rule-based and hybrid 
reasoning have had mixed degrees of success in providing negotiation support.  The 
Mediator proved quite successful in its retrieval and adaptation of previous cases.  
NEGOPLAN used rule-based reasoning to successfully model Canadian industrial 
disputes, while PERSUADER successfully modeled US industrial disputes through the 
use of a hybrid case and rule-based methodology.  Family_Negotiator however, did not 
perform to its initial expectations, primarily due to its relatively simple modeling of the 
domain.  
Apart from AdjustWinner, most of the systems surveyed above do not make 
allowances for measuring the fairness or justness of the settlement.  Further, most of 
the systems discussed are rarely based on theories derived from practice or empirical 
studies.  For example, INSPIRE [10] and SmartSettle [16] use Pareto Optimisation 
techniques to suggest optimal solutions. Our goal is to provide feasible suggested 
solutions to the conflict that are acceptable to the user, rather than searching for optimal 
solutions.   
AssetDivider is our latest development in negotiation support systems.  It extends 
on Family_Winner by modifying its’ decision making theory to provide advice based 
on interests and the monetary value of items.  Family_Winner provides advice based 
only on interests (known in the system as ratings) given by the disputants.  The rest of 
the paper will discuss the architecture and theories behind Asset Divider.  Section 3 
will illustrate how the system works though an example.  
3. Theory implemented into AssetDivider 
This section will discuss the theory used to develop AssetDivider.  Since the 
system was developed from the theories in Family_Winner; we will be drawing 
attention to AssetDivider’s differences and similarities in relation to Family_Winner.  
We will be assuming the reader has no prior knowledge of AssetDivider’s predecessor.   
3.1 Family_Winner and AssetDivider’s input and output 
Family_Winner takes a list of issues (usually items for distribution between two 
parties) and allocates them based on a rating given by the parties in dispute.  Two sets 
of ratings are provide, one for each party in dispute.  This rating (a numerical value 
between 0 and 100) does not represent the monetary value of the item, instead it 
symbolises how important the item is to the party. We assume a party wants to keep an 
item they feel is important to them. 
Similarly, AssetDivider accepts a list of items together with ratings (two per item) 
to indicate the item’s importance to a party.  In addition it also accepts the current 
monetary value of each item in dispute.  We assume this dollar value has been 
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negotiated (if necessary) before AssetDivider is used2
3.2 Family_Winner and AssetDivider’s Allocation Strategy 
.  Hence, only one dollar value is 
entered per item.  The proposed percentage split is also entered; this reflects what 
percentage of the common pool items in dispute each party is likely to receive in the 
settlement.  The system is not capable of determining the percentage split; this figure 
has to be derived from the mediator’s knowledge in past cases or from computer 
systems such as SplitUp [21], which can provide a percentage split given certain 
characteristics and features of divorce cases.  
The order by which issues are allocated is of paramount importance in a 
negotiation.  Professional mediators have indicated issues attracting little disputation 
should be presented foremost for allocation, so as to help foster a positive environment 
in which to negotiate.  By summing the ratings of issues to 100, the level of discourse 
surrounding an issue can be measured by calculating the numerical distance between 
the ratings of an issue assigned by each of the parties.  For example, if two parties 
assign the same high rating to an item, then it is expected the level of disputation 
surrounding the issue to be substantial (because both parties want the item), whereas 
large differences between the ratings of parties indicate the issue will be resolved much 
more quickly.  Both Family_Winner and AssetDivider use this strategy in deciding the 
order by which items are presented for allocation. 
Family_Winner allocates items to parties according to whoever values them the 
most. Once an item has been allocated to a party, the remaining ratings (of items still in 
dispute) are changed by trade-off equations.  These modifications try to mimic the 
effect losing or gaining an item will have on the rest of the items still in dispute.  The 
equations directly modify ratings by comparing each one against that of the item 
recently lost or won (each party’s set of ratings are modified as a result of an 
allocation).  The equations update ratings based on a number of variables - whether the 
item allocated was lost or gained, the value of the allocated item in relation to items 
still in dispute and the value of the item whose rating will change as a result.  In 
Family_Winner, the extent to which ratings were modified was determined through an 
analysis of data we collected from mediation cases provided by the Australian Institute 
of Family Studies.  These are detailed in [1].   
AssetDivider accepts items, a rating per issue and the monetary value of an item 
(unlike Family_Winner, which does not consider the monetary value of items at all).  
The allocation strategy as described above, is similar to that in Family_Winner, except 
that the equations have been modified to reflect greater fairness by considering the 
price of an item.  AssetDivider’s allocation strategy works by provisionally allocating 
an item to the party whose rating is the highest.  It then checks the dollar value of items 
it has been allocated previously (that is, their current list of items), the dollar value of 
the item presently allocated and the dollar amount permitted under the percentage split 
given by mediators.   If by allocating the item in question the party exceeds its 
permitted amount, the item is removed from its allocation list and placed back into 
negotiation.  In this case, the item has not been allocated to a party.  If the dollar value 
of the item was within the limits of the amount permitted under the percentage split 
                                                          
2 Sometimes the parties cannot agree on the monetary value of the item.  In this case, mediators would 
reference standard objective tables and the like to reach a consensus.  For example, if parties are arguing over 
the value of a car, then mediators may access websites that gave independent valuations, such as 
redbook.com.au.  
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rule, then the allocation proceeds.  Once an allocation has occurred the ‘losing party’ is 
compensated by the trade-off equations modifying ratings (whereas in Family_Winner 
both winning and losing parties were affected).   
The following psuedocode gives the reader an indication of what equations are 
fired and under what conditions.  Where RR = Rating(issue in dispute) – Rating(issue 
lost). 
  if party has lost the issue   
   
   If issue's rating was <= 10 then  /* graphlose0 */ 
        if RR between -10 and 0 then %change is 0.5* RR + 5   
        if RR is between 0 and 10, then %change = 5   
        If RR is between 11 and 25 then %change = -2/15*RR + 6  
        If RR is between 26 and 100 then %change = -5/75*RR + 7  
   Endif   
    
   if issue's rating was between 11 to 20 then  /* graphlose1 */ 
         If RR is –20 to 0 then %change = 5   
         If RR is between 0 and 89, then %change = -5/89RR + 5   
   Endif   
     if issue's rating was between 21 and 35 then  /* graphlose2*/ 
        if RR is between –40 and –10, then %change is -5/30 *RR + 3   
        if RR is between –10 and 0 then %change is 5/10RR + 10  
        If RR is between 0 and 15 then % change = -5/15RR + 10     
        If RR is between 15 and 44 then %change = -5/29RR + 8  
   Endif   
    
   if issue's rating was between 36 and 55 then  /*graphlose3*/ 
         if RR is –55 and –25, then %change = 15%   
         if RR is between –25 and –20 then %change = -RR -8   
         if RR is between –20 and 0 then %change = 5/20RR + 15   
         If RR is between 0 and 70, then %change = -15/70 + 15  
   Endif   
    
   if issue's rating was above 55, then /*graphlose4 */ 
     If RR is between –100 and 0 then %change is 15%.   
   Endif   
 endif /*if item was lost*/   
    
 elseif /*item was won*/   
  
 No change   
EndIf 
 
The above equations were developed using the equations in Family_Winner (that 
had been derived from data, as specified above).  Results from some case studies using 
Family_Winner revealed it was not always fair to the losing side if the winning side 
received extra points (as was the case in Family_Winner).  AssetDivider therefore 
makes no changes to the ratings of the winning side.   
Family_Winner had also attracted some criticism concerning the scaling of ratings 
to sum to 100 only once (at the initial intake).  After the system removed an item from 
the negotiation (upon allocation); it was argued that the remaining ratings in dispute 
should be scaled to 100 again.  The reasoning here is to ensure that every item has been 
allocated with the same rules in place (that is all ratings add to 100) as in the first 
item’s allocation.  Whilst theoretically this reasoning is quite sound; there was a 
problem with implementing this in practice.  We found as the number of issues in 
dispute diminished, the difference between the ratings of the same item for both parties 
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was very similar.  This result defeated the reasoning the essence of trade-offs.  It is also 
a problem when ratings are dissimilar since we do not know to which party we should 
allocate the item.  The reason why AssetDivider does not scale all ratings to 100 
following allocation is to ensure the ratings still reflect the disputant priorities they set 
initially (in the first instance).  The trade-off equations allow for some minimal change 
of ratings, which is most evident when the system compares small differences between 
ratings for an item.   
3.3 User Interface Issues 
Significant improvements to the user interface have been made to AssetDivider.  
There is more space on screen for users (we presume will be Mediators) to enter 
additional information about the case.  In addition, we have added reporting services, 
which will print case details such as case identifiers (case number), initial ratings given 
by users, ratings upon allocation and a final summary of the solutions arrived at by the 
system.  This summary will include, for each solution, the allocation list for each party 
and the monetary value of each ‘allocation list’.   
In Family_Winner, diagrams were shown on screen to describe the current ‘state of 
play’, that is the items in dispute, their values (ratings), and Relationship Ratings (RR) 
between items.  Relationship ratings are used to reflect the importance a party places on 
one item in relation to another.  Mathematically, the RR is the absolute difference 
between the ratings of two items.  We named these diagrams Trade-off Maps, which 
are based on the structure of Constraint Diagrams.  They were shown on screen just 
before an allocation occurs, in the attempt to help users understand how 
Family_Winner allocates items.  In developing AssetDivider, we decided not to include 
these Trade-off Maps, as informal discussions with users revealed they simply helped 
to confuse users – and contrary to the reason why they were developed – did not aid 
user understanding of how the system arrived at its solution.  In conjunction with 
displaying Trade-off Maps, Family_Winner would display new ratings as they change; 
that is every allocation was displayed sequentially on screen.  This made using 
Family_Winner quite tedious; as the user had to clear each screen for every allocation 
that occurred.  AssetDivider displays the solutions it has arrived at only once; at which 
point the user can choose to print or save the solutions.    
4. An Example using AssetDivider 
This section will review the process and outcome of a Family Law case on 
AssetDivider.  The aim of this exercise is to demonstrate the system’s operation in 
practice.   
The following table (table 1) describes a divorce case provided by RAQ.   
 
Item Name (including 
assets and debts) 
$ value Husband’s 
ratings 
Wife’s ratings 
House 
Mortgage  
450,000 
(200,000) 
30 60 
W car 10,000 0 10 
Boat 30,000 20 0 
Shares 50,000 30 10 
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Cash (savings) 20,000 30 20 
H Car  10,000 10 0 
Totals:  270,000   
Table 1: Intake details of the negotiation 
Suggested percentage split:  40/60  (where 40% to Husband and 60% to Wife).  
This means Husband is entitled to 108,000 and wife 162,000.  This information is 
entered in screen 1.  
 
Screen 1: Intake screen for negotiation 
The next screen that appears lists the issues in dispute, their ratings and the 
allocation summary, which is populated when the user clicks button “Calculate 
allocations”.  In the Allocation Summary table, we can see that the ratings for Husband 
(party A) and Wife (party B) are scaled to add to 100 in columns 
ComputedValuePartyA and ComputedValuePartyB respectively.  It is these ratings that 
are used to drive the allocation.  
 
 
Screen 2: This screen gives the user the allocation list for each party and the percentage split achieved. 
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According to AssetDivider, the preferred outcome, taking into account each 
party’s’ priorities (ratings) and percentage split indicated:  
 
Husband’s List of Allocated Items Husband’s $ value of each item Wife’s list of Allocated Items Wife’s $ value of each item 
Boat   30,000 House 450,000 
Shares   50,000 W Car 10,000 
Cash    20,000 Mortgage (200,000) 
H car   10,000   
Table 2: Allocation list for Husband (party A) and Wife (party B). 
 
Totals for Husband: $110,000; and wife: $160,000; that is very close to the 40/60 
split requested. 
 
In analyzing the case, we can see that husband (Party A) wanted the shares (27.50), 
then the house (25) and savings (23.49).  He valued the boat at 16.67, his car 
(Husband’s car) 8.68 and W(wife’s) car 0.  Given he is entitled to only 40 % of the 
total, we consider he would be happy with his allocation of the boat, shares, cash 
saving and his car (H car).  The wife valued the house quite considerably at 55.56.  
Obtaining the house was her priority above all else.  The rest were valued quite 
minimally, with shares at 18.52, boat 11.11, her car (W car) and H car at 3.70 each and 
cash savings at 7.41.  We believe she would also be happy with her allocation, as she 
was given the house (of utter importance) and her car (W car).   
The reason why Husband and Wife were both allocated the cars was because each 
valued each other’s at 0.  As long as their allocation did not violate the percentage split 
allowance, there was no real negotiation between who wanted the cars. 
Due to space limitations, we are unable to detail the effect of trade-off equations 
on the negotiation.  The reader can safely assume ratings did not influence the 
allocation greatly, as all items were allocated to those who wanted them the most. 
5. Conclusion and future work. 
This article aims to describe AssetDivider as a new Negotiation Decision Support 
System (NDSS) in family law mediation, and does so by making mention of its 
predecessor, Family_Winner.  Family_Winner was developed from the theories in the 
author’s PhD, and AssetDivider represents an improved version.  An obvious question 
to ask is how Asset Divider is different from Family_Winner.  There are a number of 
similarities and differences, particularly in the decision making module of the system.  
In both systems the interest (rating given to symbolise the importance of the item to the 
party) is used to temporarily assign the asset to a party.  AssetDivider tests whether the 
asset’s dollar value exceeds their allowable amount (given by the percentage split set 
by the mediator).  We have also improved the trade-off strategy and have made 
extensive improvements to its user interface and reporting services.  
AssetDivider has not been extensively evaluated at this point in time.  It is 
expected mediators at RAQ will test and evaluate the system in the near future.  We are 
expecting results from testing to indicate further improvements to the decision making 
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module and in particularly to the user interface.  Our research has revealed a lack of 
negotiation support systems used in family law.  We hope our collaboration with RAQ 
will enable AssetDivider to be used in their organisation, being one of the first 
negotiation support systems to do so. 
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